India latest
In 2006, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had described the naxal insurgency as the biggest internal security threat for the country.
Eleven years later, Monday's attack on CRPF jawans in Sukma underlines that the situation has not changed for better, particularly in Chhattisgarh.
24 CRPF jawans lost their lives.
Chhattisgarh has seen some of the bloodiest Maoist attacks in the past decade. The Dantewada attack on CRPF camp in April 2010 remains the biggest attack. 72 CRPF and one police jawan were killed.
Some of the deadliest Maoist attacks in Chhattisgarh include:
Attack in Bijapur in May 2010 when eight CRPF jawans were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle.
In June 2010, 26 CRPF jawans were killed when naxals ambushed the paramilitary forces.
In May 2013, 25 top leaders of the Congress were killed by the naxals in Darbha valley of Chhattisgarh.
Again in February 2014, naxals killed six policemen in Dantewada district.
The naxal insurgents followed this attack with another one in March 2014, when 15 security personnel were killed in Sukma.
In April 2015, seven policemen were killed again in Sukma.
In March this year, Naxals killed 12 CRPF jawans at Sukma before launching a fresh attack on the paramilitary forces on April 24 in the same district.
The question arises why do naxals succeed attack after attack in Chhattisgarh's insurgency hotbed?
LOCAL SUPPORT FOR NAXALS
The local tribal groups live on the margins of development in Chhattisgarh. The government schemes have failed to bring substantial changes in their lives. The basic civic amenities of health, education and sanitation have not reached hundreds of the tribal villages.
The tribal people have genuine grievances and naxal groups exploit this situation to their advantage with their propaganda. The naxals do enjoy local support, which may, at times, be coercive as the villagers are threatened with dire consequences if they informed the security forces about the activities of the insurgents.
Local support for the naxals makes it difficult for the security forces to get accurate information about the insurgents.
However, the naxals get information about the presence and movement of the forces through villagers, some of whom are also employed in government.
SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE OF TOPOGRAPHY
About 44 per cent of Chhattisgarh is covered under forest of the Eastern Highlands - the hills and plateaus. This makes the topography very difficult for patrolling by the security forces.
Tribal village are settled in between the forests and hills. Naxals have established their bases on the margins of the villages and also deep in the forests.
Naxals launch their operations in the nearby areas and flee into the forests. Naxals are very well aware of the topography of the forest land and the hills. The security forces are struggle to keep pace with the naxals as they lack accurate knowledge of the terrain.
SUPPLY OF WEAPONS
Naxals have sophisticated weapons. These weapons are either smuggled or snatched from the armed forces including police during targeted raids by the naxal groups.
Procurement of arms by the naxals is done in many ways.
They collect small old guns from the local population
They snatch and loot arms from local police outposts
They bribe security forces sell their firearms
They make, according to some reports, arms in their own small manufacturing units.
They collaborate with other insurgent groups to keep supply of arms going.
They smuggle arms and ammunitions through the porous international borders with Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
They get arms, according to some reports, from countries like China and Pakistan where some groups are sympathetic to the naxals with and without the support of the establishment.
USE OF TRIBALS AS HUMAN SHIELD
In several cases, the security forces get timely intelligence inputs about an impending naxal plan or attack, but neutralising the insurgents becomes difficult for the personnel as they bump into the human
Eleven years later, Monday's attack on CRPF jawans in Sukma underlines that the situation has not changed for better, particularly in Chhattisgarh.
24 CRPF jawans lost their lives.
Chhattisgarh has seen some of the bloodiest Maoist attacks in the past decade. The Dantewada attack on CRPF camp in April 2010 remains the biggest attack. 72 CRPF and one police jawan were killed.
Some of the deadliest Maoist attacks in Chhattisgarh include:
Attack in Bijapur in May 2010 when eight CRPF jawans were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle.
In June 2010, 26 CRPF jawans were killed when naxals ambushed the paramilitary forces.
In May 2013, 25 top leaders of the Congress were killed by the naxals in Darbha valley of Chhattisgarh.
Again in February 2014, naxals killed six policemen in Dantewada district.
The naxal insurgents followed this attack with another one in March 2014, when 15 security personnel were killed in Sukma.
In April 2015, seven policemen were killed again in Sukma.
In March this year, Naxals killed 12 CRPF jawans at Sukma before launching a fresh attack on the paramilitary forces on April 24 in the same district.
The question arises why do naxals succeed attack after attack in Chhattisgarh's insurgency hotbed?
LOCAL SUPPORT FOR NAXALS
The local tribal groups live on the margins of development in Chhattisgarh. The government schemes have failed to bring substantial changes in their lives. The basic civic amenities of health, education and sanitation have not reached hundreds of the tribal villages.
The tribal people have genuine grievances and naxal groups exploit this situation to their advantage with their propaganda. The naxals do enjoy local support, which may, at times, be coercive as the villagers are threatened with dire consequences if they informed the security forces about the activities of the insurgents.
Local support for the naxals makes it difficult for the security forces to get accurate information about the insurgents.
However, the naxals get information about the presence and movement of the forces through villagers, some of whom are also employed in government.
SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE OF TOPOGRAPHY
About 44 per cent of Chhattisgarh is covered under forest of the Eastern Highlands - the hills and plateaus. This makes the topography very difficult for patrolling by the security forces.
Tribal village are settled in between the forests and hills. Naxals have established their bases on the margins of the villages and also deep in the forests.
Naxals launch their operations in the nearby areas and flee into the forests. Naxals are very well aware of the topography of the forest land and the hills. The security forces are struggle to keep pace with the naxals as they lack accurate knowledge of the terrain.
SUPPLY OF WEAPONS
Naxals have sophisticated weapons. These weapons are either smuggled or snatched from the armed forces including police during targeted raids by the naxal groups.
Procurement of arms by the naxals is done in many ways.
They collect small old guns from the local population
They snatch and loot arms from local police outposts
They bribe security forces sell their firearms
They make, according to some reports, arms in their own small manufacturing units.
They collaborate with other insurgent groups to keep supply of arms going.
They smuggle arms and ammunitions through the porous international borders with Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
They get arms, according to some reports, from countries like China and Pakistan where some groups are sympathetic to the naxals with and without the support of the establishment.
USE OF TRIBALS AS HUMAN SHIELD
In several cases, the security forces get timely intelligence inputs about an impending naxal plan or attack, but neutralising the insurgents becomes difficult for the personnel as they bump into the human
Comments
Post a Comment